H ong Kong has undergone profound changes in recent decades.
(1) In the political sphere, the former British colony was handed over to China in 1997 under Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" formula. In the economic sphere, ever since China's reform and opening of the late 1970s and more so since the handover, Hong Kong has become increasingly linked to its hinterland in the Pearl River Delta, with which it is trying to build a megaregion of 40 million inhabitants. Hong Kong's claim to be a world city depends on a coalition of actors from the government and the business lobby developing urban policies purporting to foster economic competitiveness. However, Hong Kong's urban planning is being transformed with the emergence of civil society, (2) and of several community-based movements challenging the policies preferred by the coalition that dominates planning forums. This article aims to study the extent and nature of, as well as the alternatives emerging from, this challenge, examining the possibility of a turn towards a collaborative approach to urban planning, incorporating alternative strategies. In order to do so, this article will consider the reasons for the formation of a coalition favouring the growth and then the development of external and internal resistance to it, seeking to formulate new alternatives. The concluding portion will dwell on the significance of such evolutions with regard to the paradigmatic change towards the collaborative approach to sustainable urban planning and development in Hong Kong politics.
T he g r ow th c oal iti on of g o ve rnm e nt a nd pr iv at e ac tor s Incomplete democratic mechanisms
Hong Kong, which became a British colony in 1841, was handed back to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, but remains set apart from the rest of the People's Republic. Its mini-constitution, the Basic Law, governs the political setup characterised by the "one country, two systems" principle. It allows the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) to keep its judicial and political systems, its currency and immigration laws intact until 2047, i.e., for 50 years after the transfer of sovereignty. The SAR's ruling executive council is headed by a Chief Executive enjoying a five-year term in office. Tung Cheehwa held the post between 1997 and 2005. He was replaced by Donald Tsang, who had headed the civil service and had previously held senior posts in the colonial administration. The government is made up of 14 ministers answering to the Chief Executive. The Legislative Council, which 2. Civil society may be defined on the one hand as a group of concerned citizens in a given territory and on the other hand as a group of organisations representing them (trade unions, employers organisations, non-government organisations, professional associations, voluntary bodies, religious communities, local forums…).
china perspectives
Urban planning in Hong Kong is being transformed with the expansion of civil society and the development of various community movements. They are posing a challenge to current urban planning practices and throwing up conditions for a collaborative approach to urban planning, fashioning alternative strategies.
adopts laws but has no control over the executive, is made up of 60 members, half of them elected by popular vote in geographical constituencies and the others chosen through sectoral functional constituencies.
Thus, while Hong Kong aspires to be a "world city" (4) like New York or Tokyo, it differs greatly from those competitors. It still lacks real universal suffrage, which some regard as an obstacle to attaining global city status. There has been much debate on this issue, and on 29 December 2007, the Chinese authorities announced that the Chief Executive would be elected through universal suffrage in 2017 and the legislature in 2020.
A coalition bet ween the political elite and businesses
At the outset it may be noted that Hong Kong's territory is characterised by its small size and the extent of natural landscape dominated by hills and slopes. Just 20 percent of the territory is built up, and more than 38 percent is protected by the Country Parks Ordinance. There are two main forms of habitation in Hong Kong: high density areas around Victoria Harbour and newly developed areas on the one hand, and low density villages and semi-urban areas on the other. Another distinguishing feature of Hong Kong is the mode of ownership and management of land area. The government owns all the land, with the exception of the plot on which St John's Cathedral stands, and grants leases for certain periods of time. This puts Hong Kong's government in a crucial situation, giving it more powers than enjoyed in Western countries. The city often held up as highly liberal paradoxically thus reveals a rather more interventionist side.
(5) The government can easily influence the general use to which plots of land are put by, for instance, favouring major interest groups under the control of tycoons, especially when it is fiscally opportune for the authorities. The theory of urban regimes, (6) or that of growth coalitions,
helps clarify this situation through the idea that municipal governance is often characterised by an arrangement between public and private actors pursuing economic growth. Citing Atlanta, in the US state of Georgia, Clarence Stone noted the early formation of a biracial coalition between a small economic interest group in the central business district and representatives of the black community. This coalition helped maintain racial tolerance and formulate highly effective and innovative urban policies for economic development. Among the various approaches with regard to local authorities, the urban regime theory considers them to represent a process of social production rather than of social control. Thus, contrary to the debates pitting pluralists against elitists over the question "who governs?", this theory is more concerned with the means needed to put in place a capacity for action. It is therefore about a universe in which the authorities are seen as constituting an action agent rather than an instrument of domination. According to the urban regime approach, the actors and institutions are implicated in a complex system. In this context, the state can find it difficult to be an agent of authority and control, the government acting more as a resource mobiliser and coordinator. To be effective, governments have to ally with a number of non-governmental actors: "In responding to social change and conflict, governmental and non-governmental actors are encouraged to form regimes to facilitate action and empower themselves." (8) In concrete terms, a regime is defined thus: "An informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions. Participants are likely to have an institutional base; that is, they are likely to have a domain of command power. The regime, however, is formed as an informal basis for coordination and without an all encompassing structure of command." (9) In Asia, Singapore offers the prime example of a phenomenon in which state interests are mixed up with those of the ruling party and its leaders. The urban regime in place generates impressive economic growth (there is talk of "Singapore, Inc.") that facilitates many paternalistic policies, especially the major public housing programmes. Hong Kong's situation is quite similar, (10) with the government's centrality being in effect the basis for the constitution of this urban regime. It owns all the land and has the means to act strate-gically in regulating the economy and society. The business lobby, symbolised by tycoons who dominate the major property groups and control massive resources, constitutes the other facet of this coalition. Hong Kong's originality lies in the system of socio-professional constituencies that give the business lobby a much greater weight than envisaged in Stone's theory: "Whereas in other countries, business lobbies try to buy the support of politicians, usually through large campaign contributions, in Hong Kong, the situation is reversed. The government is put in the peculiar position of having to stay in the good graces of the business lobbies, or risk losing valuable political support."
(11) These two actors thus have different but complementary resources and interests. They depend on the same system based on trust rather than authority or hierarchy. Contrary to the theoretical model based on Western experiences, Hong Kong's civil society, trade unions, and other citizen groups are still largely excluded from this dynamic, due as much to the institutional and political context as to the nature of the compromise adopted in the urban regime. The business lobby therefore wants to keep its dominant position. Some tycoons even have seats on the legislature and benefit from direct access to decision-making. They want to preserve that by applying breaks on any evolution towards democratisation universal suffrage: "Thus now we see wealthy businessmen and women in LegCo arguing that they provide a counterweight to irresponsible popular politics, that Hong Kong is not ready for democracy, and that what is best for the economy and the public is only coincidentally what is best for themselves." (12) This urban regime resembles a growth coalition and defends a municipal development model favouring regional economic competitiveness. These city planning choices are aimed at projecting Hong Kong as a "world city." (13) In fact, ever since China adopted economic reforms in the late 1970s, Hong Kong's economic base has shifted from being an Asian Tiger along with Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. Hong Kong has moved its industrial sector out into the Pearl River Delta, especially to Shenzhen, where the tycoons control part of the action, and has largely replaced it with a services sector mainly based on finance. This evolution in the economic base implies a change in the city's occupation modes. The need for industrial areas often situated on the periphery gave way to a large extent to the demand for other types of space, mostly for offices. This evolution added to the tradition of land reclamation around Victoria Harbour, (14) both on Hong Kong Island around the Central district and on the Kowloon side, especially the area that for many decades housed the Kai Tak Airport, the fate of which is now the subject of much debate. This tradition of reclamation boosts the interests of the government, which sees in it the opportunity to carve out new high-value space to boost its coffers. This collusion between political and economic elites underpins Hong Kong's planning system.
Bureaucratic planning in favour of economic competit iveness
In terms of public policy making, urban planning forms part of a traditional mode of intervention. But the absence of universal suffrage reinforces the executive's -and the administration's -omnipresence. This rests on a strong bureaucracy, which in the normal course would tend to practice a rational mode of planning. Traditional urban planning is founded on the value of scientific knowledge and expertise, especially of associated information (statistical or cartographic). The rational model aims to serve public interest. (15) In fact, this model is dominated by a spatial approach with the objective of regulating land use and urban growth through zoning and stipulating building densities, and through ensuring infrastructure addition. British colonial tradition and now the practices of the SAR authorities leave little room for public consultation or participation in decision-making. Strategies are worked out in great secrecy and decisions are arrived at rapidly, often without debate: "The legal system has legitimized a set of planning and development processes that deny citizens a right to participate and confines decision-making power to a privileged few at the apex of the power structure." (16) The organisation of Hong Kong's government follows a traditional model grafted onto a rational period. On the ladder of participation, (17) ranging from manipulation to co-decision via information and partnership, Hong Kong languishes at the lower rungs. Besides, the Transport and Housing Bureau has more clout than the Environment Bureau, and so policy- 
the growth coalition's favoured urban policies rest on enhancing economic attractiveness in order to promote Hong Kong's competitive edge over other cities. In this perspective, building strategies of cities tend to imitate each other, (19) leading to expansion of business districts offering office towers, conference and exhibition centres, high speed train stations, or quick connections to the international airport. Hong Kong's International Finance Centre (IFC) is typical of this evolution, having enlisted star architect Cesar Pelli for its imposing second tower. This marks the urban landscape to the point of turning it into city branding. Needless to say, it focuses on superior tertiary activities; the trade centre hosts top brands and the most luxurious services, and enjoys proximity to a transport hub with a quick hop to the airport. Meanwhile, housing has also been transformed to offer high-class luxury to expatriates or well-heeled locals who wish to enjoy the same benefits. Finally, in urban planning, two forms of rationality compete in Hong Kong: on the one side, a coalition of political and economic elites favouring economic competitiveness based on a rational planning approach; and on the other an emerging civil society challenging this urban development model and proposing instead a shift towards a community-based and sustainable model taking a collaborative approach to planning. These two sides confront each other in an often explicit manner through fierce controversies such as over the process of reclamation in Wan Chai district.
E xte rna l cha ll eng e t hroug h re si de nts ' m ob il isa ti on a nd ex p er im ent w ith com m unity ap p ro ache s to p la nni ng : The Wa n Cha i e xa mp le Wan Chai as cat alyst for local awakening
The Wan Chai Market was built in 1937 in line with contemporary architectural rules (often linked to the Bauhaus style, but specialists reject this reference). The building is steeped in history: during the wartime Japanese occupation, it was used to store corpses. (21) Artists, architects, and designers, who were conscious of the architectural significance of the old market building, were the first to protest. After their action, and at a time when redevelopment projects were proliferating in Wan Chai, local residents began to mobilise. A coalition urged the government to offer a new site to the building consortium. Urban planning officials initially refused to consider any such move, but in 2007 the government and the URA announced that the building's facade would be retained and that part of the old market would be put to commercial use to accommodate shopkeepers ousted from Wedding Card Street. The market controversy raised residents' awareness, and they began to mobilise against the development model the government was imposing via the URA, which had unveiled numerous redevelopment projects in Wan Chai, especially around Johnston Road. Of course, the area was run down and located close to business hubs, with attendant economic pressure to develop and transform it, as well as to raise the standards of local residents. 
Banners on Lee Tung Street

From prot ests to empowerment of local residents
Those in charge of community development (22) in the area denounced the destruction of old buildings as well as the community networks linked to them with the disappearance of many public spaces, especially outdoor markets. Subsequently, they decided to join a project aimed at conserving such links. In a four-storey block known as the Blue House, a symbol of Wan Chai's heritage, a "community museum" was opened in January 2007 with a twin objective: "On the one hand, we aim to preserve and propagate the cultural essence of Wanchai through exhibitions, cultural tours, workshops and other activities; on the other, we hope to encourage local participation in deciding the future of the district and cultivate a sense of belonging and cultural identification." (23) Exhibitions have periodically been held, drawing nearly 2,000 visitors a month for various activities. Activities to learn more about the area were organised to help residents reclaim it. Events displaying originality, such as "community tourism," were introduced for residents traditionally excluded from discussions on urban planning. Residents acted as guides to help explore Wan Chai.
These were often housewives, who found a means of empowerment in such activities. (24) Such empowerment may be defined as "the process by which an individual or group acquires the means to strengthen the ability for emancipation."
(25) These forms of empowerment are different from the North American or European experience, because in Hong Kong it is not about the exhaustion of a Keynesian type of regulation model but rather reflects the intrinsically asymmetric nature of exchanges between the business-friendly government and civil society. The main argument to justify this process is the ruling coalition's inability to address the Wan Chai area's real problems and issues. Thus the aim is to put new constraints on the dominant actors so as to question their legitimacy and thereby take part in strengthening civil society. Beyond the issues linked to urban redevelopment, such actions aim to sustain the transition towards an emancipation of the tools and practices of Hong Kong's democracy. There is a lack of appreciation by the URA concerning the value of ordinary buildings. A group of ordinary buildings can create an extraordinary urban environment. This is particularly true when the group of buildings also share common activities. Such urban environments gradually evolve and become part of our urban culture. This is the case of Wan Chai Lee Tung Street, known as "Wedding Card Street," Mong Kok Sai Yee Street or "Sneaker Street" and the "Ladies Street." For example most of the buildings surrounding "Sneaker Street" and "Ladies 
The URA's methods, and the criticism they generated, were reminiscent of the controversy over former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's inner cities policy. The British government, through the Urban Development Corporation, gave private promoters the task of revitalising dilapidated areas but with hardly a word to local residents: "Armed with decision-making powers and huge funding, the UDC transformed the areas targeted with contrasting results. When the area concerned held great potential, such as the entirely redeveloped London Dockyard, it was a success for the promoters, who filled it with office blocks and standing residences. But it was a mixed bag, as it meant the departure of the poor people who lived there and who had to move with no benefit." (27) Finally, Wan Chai symbolises a challenge, external and from the ground, of the dominant coalition and its urban development model favouring modernisation and competitiveness. The controversy over the central waterfront exemplified a different kind of opposition to this model, but it came from within the coalition itself.
An inte rna l cha ll eng e f r om a se ctio n o f the b usi ness com m unity: T he Ce ntr al Wa te rf ro nt ex pe ri enc e
Conflict ing dimensions of capitalisation and development of t he waterfront
The development of the waterfront has followed Hong Kong's historic tradition of reclamation.
The project also exemplifies a recurrent theme in urban planning. The transition to a post-Fordist economy has led to reviewing the use of harbourside areas that had undergone urbanisation or major industrialisation. With Hong Kong's transformation into a financial centre, the development of central areas has been sped up. In 1989, the government proposed the Central and Wan Chai Reclamation project. Reclamation projects have always attracted polemics, but in 1996 it became more controversial. The Society for Protection of the Harbour (SPH), formed a year earlier, launched the "Save Our Harbour" campaign, collecting 170,000 signatures. The same year, the SPH forced the government to withdraw its plan to reclaim 190 hectares around Green Island and to put forward a legislative bill to protect the harbour. With 95 percent support from Hong Kongers, (30) the bill was passed into law. It deems the harbour "a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong." The SPH has played a major role in the mobilisation and structuring of civil society response to such projects, and it has attracted support from several other organisations.
(31) In October 2003, the "Citizen Envisioning @ Harbour" (CE@H) coalition was created to demand greater participation in decision-making with regard to urban development. The coalition used the main tools of collaborative approach, organising exhibitions, roundtables with residents, and public demonstrations. A Harbour Business Forum (HBF) was set up, attracting business people (111 members) to champion a "dynamic, accessible, and sustainable" vision of the waterfront. In response to these actions, the government in 2004 set up the "Harbourfront Enhancement Committee" (HEC), inviting representatives from CE@H and HBF. The HEC helped signal to the government the need for greater openness in the planning process. The novelty lay in the partici- china perspectives pation of a section of the business community that began to challenge the pro-growth coalition by promoting a more balanced vision of development. Thus, contrary to the Wan Chai experience, protests sprang not only from outside but also from within the ruling coalition's constituency.
C ontroversy ov er Central Waterfront construction facing the IFC
Since 2008, debate has focused on the construction of new towers facing the IFC complex, (32) which consists of two towers, the taller one 88 storeys high, and a shopping mall. The government proposed building a 30-storey block as well as another of 18 storeys. IFC representatives denounced the erection of a structure blocking their view of the harbour and forming a wall around the promenade. They insisted on the need to review the project so that the waterfront can be "returned to the people." (33) The IFC asked a group of architects and urban planners to design an alternative plan offering 9,600 square metres of public space. It included restaurants, cafes, and bars highlighting plentiful public space linking the waterfront and the business centre, in particular a large fountain that could be converted to host group events. The IFC representatives sought to stress community engagement: "We're doing this for the public benefit." Like the actions mounted by CE@H, they used collaborative methods relying on communication and interaction. In fact, they noted at the outset that their model stemmed from planners who had spent the major part of their time talking and interacting: "This talk is a form of practical, communicative action." (34) From this perspective, dialogue and other forms of communication could influence actors and situations: "Planners are deeply engaged in a web of communicative and interactive activities that influence public and private actions in direct and indirect ways ." (35) The IFC lobby held an exhibition of the competing scenarios of development. Young activists explained the various panels and models and asked visitors to sign a petition, which gained some 22,000 signatures in the first two months of 2009. Of course, the obstruction of part of the view the IFC commands could slash the tower's property value. There was also talk that some owners who controlled parts of the New Territories did not want to see any new buildings in the city centre so as to preserve the value of their holdings. While this stand coincides with that favouring more sustainable and collaborative planning, it also exposes the hidden face of the actors (public, private, or community) involved in the complex power relations, who hide behind grand slogans in order to defend their narrow interests. In response to the IFC's stand, the dominant coalition let it be known, through the government, that the proposed new buildings would not block IFC's view, and that after all it was the march of history, the IFC having itself blocked the view of several older towers: "The two blocks are much shorter than the IFC, how can they block views? (…) The IFC doesn't allow people to block its view but it itself has done this for a long time." (36) Further, the coalition stressed the need to offer new office space to sustain economic growth and deal with the current crisis. 
china perspectives
The debate continues, with both sides sticking to their positions, but as with previous episodes, the government could be forced to make a concession. It did so in 2008, when the project size was slashed by 25 percent. Hong Kongers care about the waterfront, just as they did about Lee Tung Street. Many argue for an alternative vision of redevelopment:
"The government need to find ways to make our city self-develop in a sustainable manner, continuous reclamation and adding buildings here and there is not the solution. We want a waterfront for all, not for the developers."
Fr om cha ll eng e s to the d om ina nt c oa lit ion, to a new a p pr oa ch to pl anni ng ?
The experiences with Wan Chai and the Central waterfront followed similar controversies over the former HMS Tamar site and the West Kowloon Cultural District, showing that voices denouncing the two dominant actors in planning have been rising. But to what extent can the emergence and strengthening of civil society define this system?
Emerging civil society
Since the 1980s, Hong Kong's civil society has been emerging and growing in strength. The handover was followed by the Asian financial crisis and the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic. The old social contract, under which Hong Kongers stayed out of political debates until the economy picked up, was challenged. In July 2003, the government sought to push through a law on subversion (envisaged under Article 23 of Hong Kong's Basic Law), but civil society (dormant since 1989) burst forth with a mammoth rally of more than 500,000 people, who voiced their fears for freedom of the press, of religion, and of association. The proposed law was dropped after the loss of majority support from legislators. This led to top-level departures, including that of Tung Chee-hwa on 10 March 2005, albeit 20 months after the public protest. His successor, Donald Tsang, signalled a change of attitude. Having served in the colonial regime and as Chief Secretary, Tsang was the best-placed civil servant to take over the helm. He enjoyed some popularity among the city's residents, who thought he was more capable than Tung of implementing political reforms and also ensuring prosperity.
Thus the first post-handover decade saw a strengthening of civil society: "Following July 1, Hong Kong has seen consecutive social movements to demand universal suffrage, defend its core values, and preserve its natural and historical heritage (Victoria Harbour, Star Ferry and Queen's Pier, to name the notable themes). These are not sporadic campaigns; they articulate a common desire, particularly amongst the younger post-1980s generation, to search for Hong Kong's identity and worth from colonial past." (38) Civil society: New actor in the coalition?
Civil society may have grown in strength and vitality, but it has not emerged as a full player within the Hong Kong urban planning regime, and is still dismissed as "vibrant but loosely organized." (39) The planning regime remains a partnership in which the government and the business lobby are complicit and complement each other. Civil society's inclusion in this coalition could upset the very nature of the urban planning regime, which explains why such an eventuality would be problematic. A stronger civil society could boost the influence of pro-democracy parties in the SAR. Moreover, with interests and values divorced from those of the dominant actors, civil society could in fact transform the planning style with a more collaborative and community-based approach, and also a content that pays attention to sustainable development and no longer orients public policies towards the city's attractiveness and economic competitiveness.
Collaborative turn in the context of an unfinished democrat ic transition
The issue of a move towards a collaborative approach has been subject to theoretical debates of urban planning for two decades now.
(40) Building a consensus through improved interaction between different actors could help ameliorate urban strategies, it is thought: "In the ideal of collaborative planning, stakeholders representing the differing interests meet for faceto-face dialogue and collectively work out a strategy to address a shared problem. Participants work through joint fact finding and agree on a problem, mission and actions. The players learn and co-evolve. Under the right conditions, this dialogue can produce results that are more than the sum of the parts." (41) This vision has gripped Western societies and has emerged in sharp relief in emerging or newly developed economies (42) such as Hong Kong, as it highlights the difficulties faced in effecting such a change as well as the need to achieve democratic transition in order to make a success of the process. Hooshang Amirahmadi and David Gladstone (43) have come up with a theory of possible ways in which civil society may emerge in newly developed countries. They stress three possible stages:
• The first, strong development with a dominant state and weak civil society; • The second, in which civil society asserts itself and confronts the state; • The third, with two possibilities: development paralysis through the domination of the state or civil society or more sustainable development, or a balance between the two.
In this perspective, a further hypothesis may be proffered: Hong Kong entering a transition period in which civil society asserts itself but fails to join the urban regime coalition. In addition to the development debate, Hong Kong's current situation also concerns its post-colonial identity: "This postcolonial (re)turn is actually more a recolonization than a decolonization of the capitalist Cantonese city by the mainland Mandarin master." (44) The political and institutional situation has led some researchers, such as Mee Kam Ng, to focus their work on the possibility of such a development although political reforms are still under discussion. (45) High-profile actors and groups such as Christine Loh and her think tank, Civic Exchange, also acknowledge the need to achieve a democratic transition in order to secure for civil society a place in the sun: "Civil society does not only act as a watchdog of the government and business, it is also a partner in governance. The blossoming of civil society in Hong Kong is ironically a result of an extremely awkward political system, and most of the time, civil society in Hong Kong is pitched 107 N o 2 0 1 0 / 1 against the régime. (…) This will not change unless the disarticulated nature of the political system is reformed." (46) Expanding t he network of actors in order to change urban planning
Such an evolution echoes the very sense of planning, defined as a "societal process of political coordination among the territory's network of actors." (47) Implementation of urban strategies thus implies the mobilisation of all public actors -private as well as civil society -to adopt a common vision articulating their resources and their legitimate interests. Now the success of such integration lies in the link between the planning process and the common values identified or acknowledged by different actors. (48) This raises the question of Hong Kong's "institutional strength" and thus of its ability to generate interaction and coordination mechanisms for the actors so as to bring to bear resources and legitimate interests around common objectives. This challenge concerns the aims of the collaborative approach, raising questions especially of the political leadership. (49) Western experiences show that the state often has a key role in the collaboration process in order to initiate or nurture progress. (50) The political leadership has to assume the role of a dynamic agent creating new relationships among various actors. It has to display "institutional creativity" to fashion (formal or informal) negotiation forums: more than mere institutional tools, there is a need to foster a governance culture to end the status quo and release creative forces of political economic and social actors. (51) In Hong Kong, the government-business coalition has faced internal challenges (as over the waterfront) and external ones (in Wan Chai) that tend to lead to new forms of regulation. These innovations, however, adhere to the path of dependence. (52) The local system's persistence and inertia indicate a robotic learning process. Thus any expansion of the coalition of actors and movement towards sustainable urban planning will have difficulty shaking off the logic of the Hong Kong power structure. That Hong Kong is far from the theoretical model of collaborative planning may be linked to the main challenges to this approach, especially those from the paradigm of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas. (53) These analyses recommend observing "the dark side of planning theory" (54) to note the importance of power relations deliberately neglected in literature based on communicative rationality.
The role of planners in this transition
I will conclude with a word about the role of planners in this transition. Planning theories often stress ethical considerations and the need for urban planners to have a reflexive attitude towards their practices, (55) even being pro-active in favour of social change. In order to encourage collaboration, in order to achieve a new balance of power among the state, the business lobby, and civil society -while the dominant actors command much bigger resources -they have to support social change through empowerment of civil society. Patsy Healy stresses that in the planning process, they should be "involved in the discussion, design, and management of specific actions, grasping the fine grain of the interactive dynamics of situational specifics and broader dynamics." (56) Such support from planners should help all actors adopt a collaborative attitude and overcome opposition, while ensuring that civil society avoids the easy way out of knee-jerk opposition or resistance. Hong Kong planners have been adopting this kind of proactive conduct. This was seen in the case of the "Urban Design Alliance" grouping the Hong Kong Institute of Architects and the Hong Kong Institute of Planners with the ambition to "promote the design and building of a better Hong Kong." They stress the need to develop high-density urban planning, and in the case of the waterfront controversy, suggest solutions that could be a compromise between different actors now opposing each other. (57) The expansion of the coalition of actors and the evolution of urban strategies favouring a more collaborative and sustain-
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N o 2 0 1 0 / 1 able approach involves complex processes, as they imply an evolution for each actor in the planning system: a public sphere achieving its democratic transition, a private one becoming more ecologically and socially responsible, and better organised civil society. The government's administrative reorganisation with the creation of a Development Bureau, and especially the economic crisis of 2008, might have helped unleash this transformation and the evolution of strategies towards urban policies. Hong Kong is not the only Asian metropolis facing difficulties with regard to a change towards collaborative and sustainable approaches. Singapore and Taiwan confront the same imperatives, and it is possible that some time in the future, major mainland Chinese metropolises could also tread this path. • 
